NATO Takes Over Libya Air Operations

NATO has assumed full command of all air operations over Libya, taking over from the U.S., which had played a leading role since international forces began enforcing a no-fly zone on March 19.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the transition was completed early Thursday. The NATO operation, called "Unified Protector", includes enforcing the U.N. Security Council resolution that mandates the no-fly zone along with an arms embargo and airstrikes to protect civilians.

Meanwhile, U.S. media reports say the CIA has sent teams of operatives into Libya to gather intelligence and make contact with anti-Gadhafi forces. The reports cite officials as saying intelligence agents are looking into the identities and abilities of rebel forces before foreign allies consider providing them with direct military aid.

British sources told The New York Times that British special forces and intelligence officers also are in the North African nation.

In Washington, the White House repeated that the U.S. has not made a decision on whether to provide arms to rebel forces in Libya. Wednesday's statement was issued amid reports that President Barack Obama has approved a secret authorization for covert efforts to support anti-government rebels.

Earlier Wednesday, troops loyal to Gadhafi drove anti-government rebels from key coastal cities they had seized days before, reversing opposition gains made since international airstrikes began.

Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan

Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s disaster plans greatly underestimated the scope of a potential accident at its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, calling for only one stretcher, one satellite phone and 50 protective suits in case of emergencies.

Disaster-response documents for Fukushima Daiichi, examined by The Wall Street Journal, also contain few guidelines for obtaining outside help, providing insight into why Japan struggled to cope with a nuclear crisis after an earthquake and tsunami devastated the facility.

The disaster plans, approved by Japanese regulators, offer guidelines for responding to smaller emergencies and outline in detail how to back up key systems in case of failure. Yet the plans fail to envision the kind of worst-case scenario that befell Japan: damage so extensive that the plant couldn't respond on its own or call for help from nearby plants. There are no references to Tokyo firefighters, Japanese military forces or U.S. equipment, all of which the plant operators eventually relied upon to battle their overheating reactors.

On Wednesday, the president of plant operator Tepco was hospitalized for dizziness, offering the latest sign of leadership trouble. Earlier in the disaster, Tepco was faulted for a sluggish initial response; now it appears that its written emergency plans were themselves inadequate.

"The disaster plan didn't function," said a former Tepco executive. "It didn't envision something this big."

The two main documents examined by the Journal are Fukushima Daiichi's disaster-readiness plan, which discusses general preparations and communications, and its accident-management protocol, which focuses on technical operation of plant equipment in an accident.

The main disaster-readiness manual, updated annually, envisions the fax machine as a principal means of communication with the outside world and includes detailed forms for Tepco managers when faxing government officials. One form offers a multiple-choice list of disasters, including "loss of AC power," "inability to use the control room" and "probable nuclear chain reaction outside the reactor."

Tepco spokesman Hiro Hasegawa said the plans followed and sometimes exceeded legal requirements, and proved useful in the crisis. For example, he said the emergency injection of water to cool the reactors followed the accident-management protocol.

Nuclear-power experts say few operators anywhere are likely prepared for the kind of disaster that struck Fukushima Daiichi. On March 11, the plant was hit with a magnitude 9.0 quake, followed by a tsunami estimated at 45 feet. The twin catastrophes wiped out the normal power and backup generators of nearly all the plant's six reactors and also damaged roads and communication lines through which the plant could seek help.

Previous big nuclear accidents, such as those at Three Mile Island in the U.S. and Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union, resulted from poor safety standards and bad management, said Kazuo Sato, a consultant at the Nuclear Safety Research Association, who headed Japan's watchdog Nuclear Safety Commission in the late 1990s. "This one was a natural disaster—it's qualitatively different," he said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations agency, has hundreds of pages of safety recommendations for nuclear-facility operators, but its recommendations aren't binding on individual countries. An IAEA spokesman declined to comment on whether Japanese emergency plans fulfill IAEA guidelines.

The Journal compared the Fukushima Daiichi accident-management protocol against the IAEA's general principles, and it appears the plant document generally hews to them. However, the IAEA calls for operators to cover "appropriately selected external events, such as fires, floods, seismic events and extreme weather conditions…that could damage large parts of the plant." The Fukushima Daiichi protocol doesn't specifically discuss how such events could damage the plant.

In the U.S., operators are expected to continuously update emergency plans and to conduct large-scale drills, typically lasting from eight hours to two days, at least every two years. The exercises are graded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which requires correction of deficiencies. The NRC describes the capabilities it expects plants to have but often doesn't specify the equipment required.

Critics allege Japan's regulators and operators tend to avoid talking about or preparing fuller disaster scenarios, partly to avoid scaring the public. Fukushima Daiichi's own report on its accident-management protocols says: "The possibility of a severe accident occurring is so small that from an engineering standpoint, it is practically unthinkable."

Banri Kaieda, chief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, said Wednesday that the ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency plans to tighten scrutiny of emergency plans in light of Fukushima Daiichi. "We are painfully aware" the plans were inadequate, an agency spokesman said.

Following Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, Japan's industry ministry in 1992 asked nuclear operators to come up with voluntary protocols for each of their plants in the case of accidents that exceeded their safety specifications. Those "accident-management plans" don't have to be periodically revised. Tepco submitted the report on its plan for Fukushima Daiichi in 2002.

A serious accident at a Japanese uranium-processing facility in 1999 led Parliament to pass a law on nuclear emergencies. The law requires operators to have "disaster-readiness operation plans," reviewed annually. It also sets base protocols that operators must follow, such as minimum numbers of masks.

In some cases, Fukushima Daiichi's crisis planners exceeded minimums. The plan calls for 49 radiation-detecting meters, versus six required by law, and 100 cellphones on two systems, versus the seven required.

Still, many of the numbers suggest the six-reactor plant anticipated at most a modest emergency. It calls for a four-man medical team to attend to people exposed to radiation and other victims. Four protective suits with oxygen tanks were to be stocked, as well as a single ambulance and radiation-measuring vehicle.

Much hinged on the fax machine. One section directs managers to notify the industry minister, the local governor and mayors of nearby towns of any problems "all at once, within 15 minutes, by facsimile." In certain cases, the managers were advised to follow up by phone to make sure the fax had arrived.

The disaster-response plans at other operators in Japan follow the same structure as Fukushima Daiichi's, although some are more thorough.

Accident-management plans are generally written to deal with internal plant problems and don't take into account external shocks such as a quake or terrorist attack, said Hokkaido University Prof. Kenichiro Sugiyama, who served on a government panel on nuclear accident readiness.

Tepco's Mr. Hasegawa said the company is doing its utmost to put in place "emergency-response measures based on the operational plan for disaster prevention." He pointed to successful steps such as the establishment of a disaster headquarters as soon as the quake struck.

After this crisis is settled, Japan will have to rethink everything, industry veterans said. This catastrophe shows "there is no such thing as overdoing it" in preparing a disaster manual, said Tsuneo Futami, who was superintendant at Fukushima Daiichi from 1997 to 2000. The attitude must be that "anything can happen tomorrow."

Obama's Libya Speech: No 'Doctrine,' But a Peek at Priorities

Back when Barack Obama was a Senator, he had high expectations for a new kind of U.S. foreign policy. The "United States still lacks a coherent national security policy," Obama wrote in his 2006 book The Audacity of Hope. "Instead of guiding principles, we have what appear to be a series of ad hoc decisions... Without a well-articulated strategy that the public supports and the world understands," he wrote, American actions lack "legitimacy" at home and abroad.

Now that Obama is President, he's the one being graded for clarity. "I don't think there is an Obama doctrine," said Newt Gingrich, a likely 2012 presidential contender, on March 21. "His current policy is so incoherent and so confused that it is literally indefensible." (Gaddafi Drives Out The Rebels.)

But Obama defended his policy with a March 28 speech explaining his decision to intervene militarily in Libya and offering his criteria for using military force when there's no imminent threat to America. But a full-blown "doctrine" it was not. Obama didn't explain whether any larger principles have guided him through the historic convulsions of the 2011 Arab Spring. Nor does he care to. The word doctrine "suggests a rigidity that you're going to apply in every country," says National Security Council aide Ben Rhodes. And Obama's recent actions have at times seemed to reflect the kind of ad hoc decisions he complained about in 2006. He has vocally denounced crackdowns on protesters in some countries (Libya, Egypt) but been quieter about others (Bahrain, Yemen). He was initially hesitant to intervene in Libya — then acted with surprising force. (Is Libya really a top priority?)

UK questions Libyan foreign minister

Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa has been questioned by officials after arriving in the UK unexpectedly late on Wednesday.

He flew in from Tunisia. The UK Foreign Office said he was "no longer willing" to work for Colonel Gaddafi.

However a Libyan spokesman denied that Mr Moussa had defected and said he was on a diplomatic mission.

His arrival in the UK comes as Libyan rebels retreat from former strongholds along the eastern coast.

They are in full retreat from Brega, having lost the key oil port of Ras Lanuf and the nearby town of Bin Jawad.

In the west, the rebel-held town of Misrata is still reportedly coming under attack from pro-Gaddafi troops, reports say.

'Own free will'

A British Foreign Office spokesperson said Mr Koussa - who is in his early 60s - had arrived at Farnborough airport, west of London, on Wednesday evening.

"He has told us that he is resigning his post. We are discussing this with him and we will release further details in due course.

"Moussa Koussa is one of the most senior figures in Gaddafi's government and his role was to represent the regime internationally - something that he is no longer willing to do.

Libya: The challenges facing allies

Defence sources say forces loyal to Libyan leader Col Gaddafi are starting to feel the pinch on their arms supply as the coalition air campaign "chops the legs" off their already-stretched supply chain.

A long-range bombing raid by US and British warplanes earlier this week destroyed a major ammunition dump storing small arms and artillery munitions.

Home to some 40 concealed underground bunkers, the coalition believes it could have been used by pro-Gaddafi forces against civilians in areas such as Misrata and Zintan in the north.

"With highly targeted strikes like this we are hitting Gaddafi's forces where it hurts, limiting their supply lines and in turn reducing their capability to kill their own civilians," said UK Defence Secretary Liam Fox.

"Over the last few days UK jets over the skies of Libya have taken out a lot of Gaddafi's military assets, including air defence systems, tanks and armoured personnel carriers, in line with the [UN resolution]."

Military sources say that the coalition's air strikes so far have ensured the regime's forces have been "seriously degraded". However, there are indications that further air strikes on military ammunition dumps or forces attacking towns are likely to continue, as "there is more to do to prevent more loss of life".

Rebel problems

As the fighting in and around key towns in Libya continues, it is also believed that Col Gaddafi's loyalists are still recruiting more foreign fighters or mercenaries from outside Libya, from countries such as Chad, Mali and Niger, and using them mainly to control urban areas.

All this seems to indicate that while the coalition's strikes may have successfully removed many of the larger weapons in the pro-Gaddafi forces' armoury, much of their command and control and the majority of air defences, the hope that Col Gaddafi's regime would crumble rapidly from within has not been fulfilled.